India and Pakistan are in crisis again - here's how they de-escalated in the past

Last week's deadly militant attack in Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, which claimed 26 civilian lives, has reignited a grim sense of déjà vu for India's security forces and diplomats.

This is familiar ground. In 2016, after 19 Indian soldiers were killed in Uri, India launched "surgical strikes" across the Line of Control – the de facto border between India and Pakistan - targeting militant bases.

In 2019, the Pulwama bombing, which left 40 Indian paramilitary personnel dead, prompted airstrikes deep into Balakot - the first such action inside Pakistan since 1971 - sparking retaliatory raids and an aerial dogfight.

And before that, the horrific 2008 Mumbai attacks - a 60-hour siege on hotels, a railway station, and a Jewish centre - claimed 166 lives.

Each time, India has held Pakistan-based militant groups responsible for the attacks, accusing Islamabad of tacitly supporting them - a charge Pakistan has consistently denied.

Since 2016, and especially after the 2019 airstrikes, the threshold for escalation has shifted dramatically. Cross-border and aerial strikes by India have become the new norm, provoking retaliation from Pakistan. This has further intensified an already volatile situation.

Once again, experts say, India finds itself walking the tightrope between escalation and restraint - a fragile balance of response and deterrence. One person who understands this recurring cycle is Ajay Bisaria, India's former high commissioner to Pakistan during the Pulwama attack, who captured its aftermath in his memoir, Anger Management: The Troubled Diplomatic Relationship between India and Pakistan.

"There are striking parallels between the aftermath of the Pulwama bombing and the killings in Pahalgam," Mr Bisaria told me on Thursday, 10 days after the latest attack.

Yet, he notes, Pahalgam marks a shift. Unlike Pulwama and Uri, which targeted security forces, this attack struck civilians - tourists from across India - evoking memories of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. "This attack carries elements of Pulwama, but much more of Mumbai," he explains.

"We're once again in a conflict situation, and the story is unfolding in much the same way," Mr Bisaria says.

A week after the latest attack, Delhi moved quickly with retaliatory measures: closing the main border crossing, suspending a key water-sharing treaty, expelling diplomats, and halting most visas for Pakistani nationals - who were given days to leave. Troops on both sides have exchanged intermittent small-arms fire across the border in recent days.

Delhi also barred all Pakistani aircraft - commercial and military - from its airspace, mirroring Islamabad's earlier move. Pakistan retaliated with its own visa suspensions and suspended a 1972 peace treaty with India. (Kashmir, claimed in full by both India and Pakistan but administered in parts by each, has been a flashpoint between the two nuclear-armed nations since their partition in 1947.)

In his memoir, Mr Bisaria recounts India's response after the Pulwama attack on 14 February 2019.

He was summoned to Delhi the morning after, as the government moved quickly to halt trade - revoking Pakistan's most-favoured-nation status, granted in 1996. In the following days, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) imposed a 200% customs duty on Pakistani goods, effectively ending imports, and suspended trade at the land border at Wagah.

Mr Bisaria notes that a broader set of measures was also proposed to scale down engagement with Pakistan, most of which were subsequently implemented.

They included suspending a cross-border train known as the Samjhauta Express, and a bus service linking Delhi and Lahore; deferring talks between border guards on both sides and negotiations over the historic Kartarpur corridor to one of Sikhism's holiest shrines, halting visa issuance, ceasing cross border, banning Indian travel to Pakistan, and suspending flights between the two countries.

"How hard it was to build trust, I thought. And how easy was it to break it," Mr Bisaria writes.

"All the confidence-building measures planned, negotiated, and implemented over years in this difficult relationship, could be slashed off on a yellow notepad in minutes."

The strength of the Indian high commission in Islamabad was reduced from 110 to 55 only in June 2020 after a separate diplomatic incident. (It now stands at 30 after the Pahalgam attack.) India also launched a diplomatic offensive.

A day after the attack, then foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale briefed envoys from 25 countries - including the US, UK, China, Russia, and France - on the role of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), the Pakistan-based militant group behind the bombing, and accused Pakistan of using terrorism as state policy. JeM, designated a terrorist organisation by India, the UN, the UK, and the US, had claimed responsibility for the bombing.

India's diplomatic offensive continued on 25 February, 10 days after the attack, pushing for JeM chief Masood Azhar's designation as a terrorist by the UN sanctions committee and inclusion on the EU's "autonomous terror list".

While there was pressure to abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty - a key river water sharing agreement - India opted instead to withhold any data beyond treaty obligations, Mr Bisaria writes. A total of 48 bilateral agreements were reviewed for possible suspension. An all-party meeting was convened in Delhi, resulting in a unanimous resolution.

At the same time, communication channels remained open - including the hotline between the two countries' Directors General of Military Operations (DGMO), a key link for military-to-military contact, as well as both high commissions. In 2019, as now, Pakistan said the attack was a "false-flag operation".

Much like this time a crackdown in Kashmir saw the arrest of over 80 "overground workers" - local supporters who may have provided logistical help, shelter, and intelligence to militants from the Pakistan-based group. Rajnath Singh, then Indian home minister, visited Jammu and Kashmir, and dossiers on the attack and suspected perpetrators were prepared.

In a meeting with the external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj, Mr Bisaria told her that "that India's diplomatic options in dealing with a terrorist attack of this nature was limited".

"She gave me the impression that some tough action was round the corner, after which, I should expect the role of diplomacy to expand," Mr Bisaria writes.

On 26 February, Indian airstrikes - its first across the international border since 1971 - targeted JeM's training camp in Balakot.

Six hours later, the Indian foreign secretary announced the strikes had killed "a very large number" of militants and commanders. Pakistan swiftly denied the claim. More high-level meetings followed in Delhi.

The crisis escalated dramatically the next morning, 27 February, when Pakistan launched retaliatory air raids.

In the ensuing dogfight, an Indian fighter jet was shot down, and its pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, ejected and landed in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Captured by Pakistani forces, his detention in enemy territory triggered a wave of national concern and further heightened tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

Mr Bisaria writes India activated multiple diplomatic channels, with US and UK envoys pressing Islamabad. The Indian message was "any attempt by Pakistan to escalate situation further or to cause harm to the pilot would lead to escalation by India."

Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan announced the pilot's release on 28 February, with the handover occurring on 1 March under prisoner of war protocol. Pakistan presented the move as a "goodwill gesture" aimed at de-escalating tensions.

By 5 March, with the dust settling from Pulwama, Balakot, and the pilot's return, India's political temperature had cooled. The Cabinet Committee on Security decided to send India's high commissioner back to Pakistan, signalling a shift towards diplomacy.

"I arrived in Islamabad on 10 March, 22 days after leaving in the wake of Pulwama. The most serious military exchange since Kargil had run its course in less than a month," Mr Bisaria writes,

"India was willing to give old-fashioned diplomacy another chance.... This, with India having achieved a strategic and military objective and Pakistan having claimed a notion of victory for its domestic audience."

Mr Bisaria described it as a "testing and fascinating time" to be a diplomat. This time, he notes, the key difference is that the targets were Indian civilians, and the attack occurred "ironically, when the situation in Kashmir had dramatically improved".

He views escalation as inevitable, but notes there's also a "de-escalation instinct alongside the escalation instinct". When the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meets during such conflicts, he says, their decisions weigh the conflict's economic impact and seek measures that hurt Pakistan without triggering a backlash against India.

"The body language and optics are similar [this time]," he says, but highlights what he sees as the most significant move: India's threat to annul the Indus Waters Treaty. "If India acts on this, it would have long-term, serious consequences for Pakistan."

"Remember, we're still in the middle of a crisis," says Mr Bisaria. "We haven't yet seen any kinetic [military] action."